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RESUMEN
La  implementación  honesta  en  estrategias  dominantes  de  objetivos  sociales
flexibles conlleva la posibilidad de que el planificador pueda alterar los incentivos
individuales de tal forma que la externalidad impuesta sobre la sociedad por cada
agente cuando informa sobre un tipo dado se internaliza completamente en el
pago final del agente. En otras palabras, la función objetivo de los agentes debe
imitar  o  replicar  a  los  objetivos  sociales.  Nuestro  resultado  principal  es  lo
suficientemente  robusto  como  para  explicar  por  qué  ciertos  mecanismos  muy
conocidos  como  las  transferencias  de  Groves  funcionan  en  algunos  contextos
mientras  que  algunos  otros  objetivos  sociales  no  son  implementables  en
estrategias dominantes.
Palabras  clave:  Decisividad  individual,  mecanismos  de  compensación,
estrategias dominantes.
ABSTRACT
Dominant strategies truthful implementation of flexible social objectives involves
the ability of the planner to alter the individual incentives in such a way that the
externality  imposed  on  society  by  each  agent  reporting  a  given  type  is  fully
internalized  in  the  agent’s  final  payoff.  In  other  words,  the  agents’  objective
function must mimic the social objectives. We find that our main result is robust
enough to explain why well-known mechanisms like Groves’s transfers work in
some  contexts  while  some  other  social  objectives  are  not  implementable  in
dominant strategies.
Keywords: Individual  decisiveness,  compensation  mechanisms,  dominant
strategies.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the early 70’s, the problem of designing incentive mechanisms to achieve
socially desirable outcomes has been a major concern in economics. The ini-
tial negative results due to Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [14] in the context
of unrestricted domains of preferences proved the need to impose domain
restrictions to ﬁnd some possibility results -see Dasgupta et al. [3] for a
survey-. The ﬁrst successful attempt to ﬁnd a possibility result in mixed
economies -those combining some public good with a private one- were due
to Groves [6], [7] and [8], Clarke [2] and Green & Lagont [5].
In this paper, we aim at testing a regularity that emerges in many re-
sults regarding implementability in dominant strategies of social choice rules.
Most well-known theorems regarding implementation in dominant strategies
in ”large” domains seem to imply the following: the kind of incentives that
must be given to the agents in order to induce truth-revealing behavior are
such that the payog function that the agents maximize when choosing their
optimal messages to be sent to the planner have the same structure than
the social objectives the planner himself is interested in maximizing. In
other words, dominant truth-telling strategies involve the planner’s ability
to design payog functions for the agents that fully internalize the externality
caused by each agent on the objectives of society as a whole -i.e., the plan-
ner’s objectives-. After formulating our conjecture more precisely, we ﬁnd a
characterization result that shows that when the social objectives are ﬂexible
enough -a property that we call ”individual decisiveness”, the coincidence of
private and social objectives in the design of incentives is unavoidable. Since
a wide range of well-known social objectives in economic environments fall in
this category, our main result applies and digerent applications easily emerge
from the theorem. In particular, Groves’ mechanisms in public good provi-
sion environments and the impossibility of implementing the Pareto-optimal
social choice rule in mixed public and private goods economies with prefer-
ences that are not quasi-linear emerge as particular applications of our main
result.
Explaining the motivation of the paper and being precise in what we ex-
actly mean by ”coincidence” between digerent ”objectives” requires detailed
explanations of well-known theorems that will be proven to have important
points in common that not always have been suciently highlighted in the
literature. Therefore, in Section 2 we recall these results in order to formu-
late our conjecture. In Section 3 we introduce the compensation mechanisms
and Section 4 is devoted to our main result. The main applications regard-
ing our approach are studied in Section 5 and ﬁnally, we conclude with some
comments.
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2C o n j e c t u r e
In order to motivate our approach, let us consider three well-known results:
Case 1 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard [4], Satterthwaite [14])
L e tu sc o n s i d e ras o c i e t yi nw h i c haﬁnite number n  2o fa g e n t so r
individuals, ordered in a set N = {1,...,n} and indexed by i,j 5 N choose
alternatives, social states or objects from some set K,# K>1. These
objects may be levels of provision of some public or private goods, alloca-
tions of indivisible goods, candidates for being a boss, etc.-. Let k 5 K
denote any alternative from that set. Each individual is endowed with some
private characteristic or type wi from a set Xi. A proﬁle is an element
in the Cartesian product of the sets Xi ;i 5 N. Society can be described
by a possible proﬁle w =( w1,...,wn)=( wi,w3i) 5
Qn
i=1 Xi. We call here an
economy to the tuple e = hN,K,Xi;i 5 Ni. G i v e na ne c o n o m y ,s o c i e t y
-or the social planner- would like to select alternatives depending on the
individual characteristics, so social desirability is summarized by a choice
rule denoted by KW :
Qn
i=1 Xi $$ K, called social choice correspon-
dence (SCC) that assigns a set of social states for each possible proﬁle.
A single-valued SCC is a social choice function (SCF) and will be de-
noted by f :
Qn
i=1 Xi $ K. A social welfare function (SWF) is a real-
valued function of the type: W : K ×
Qn
i=1 Xi $ E, where E is the real
line. We will say that SCC KW is generated or represented by SWF W ig
W(KW(w),w)  W(k,w) ;k 5 K, ;w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi, and W(KW)w i l lb et h es e to f
SWFs representing a given SCC KW.1.Given an economy e, suppose now that
individual objectives given the type take the form of a preference relation
on the set of alternatives, denoted by Ri(wi), ;wi 5 Xi, that is, Ri ;i 5 N is
a mapping from the possible types to the set of all ordered pairs of alter-
natives: Ri : Xi $$ K × K.2 We say that the domain is unrestricted
ig every complete weak pre-ordering is admissible as a preference relation.
Assuming that each agent’s type is his own private information and society -
or the social planner - cannot directly observe the true individual types, the
rule has to be based on the revealed types rather than on the true individual
types. We are interested in SCFs such that each agent has no any incentive
to lie about his true type in any case - whatever types the rest of agents
1Notice that for every SCC K,t h es e tW(K) is non-empty: the constant SWF
trivially represents every SCC.
2We are implicitly assuming that the economy is such that allow for the deﬁnition of
individual preferences.
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report to the planner and whatever be the agent’s true type -. We say that
aS C Fi sstrategy-proof ig




i 5 Xi,f (w)Ri(wi)f(w
0
i,w3i).
Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [14] proved that whenever the domain is un-
restricted and #range(f)  3, the only strategy-proof social choice functions
are dictatorial, i.e., <i 5 N such that ;w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi,f (w) 5 argmax Ri(w)
s.t. k 5 range(f)
Case 2 Roberts’ [13] Theorem.
L e tu sc o n s i d e ra ne c o n o m ye such that K is a ﬁnite set. We furthermore
assume that the agents’ objectives are not deﬁned by the preference ordering
on K associated to each type, but by a real-valued payog of the kind:
;i 5 N, Pi : K × E × Xi $ E
Where Pi is quasi-linear with respect to the second argument, intended to
represent some out-the-model way to compensate the agent, so that we can
write agent i0s payog function in the form: Pi(k,qi,wi)=vi(k,wi)+qi, ;k 5
K, ;wi 5 Xi, ;qi 5 E, where for all i, vi : K ×Xi $ E is a real-valued func-
tion called the valuation function admitting every possible cardinal utility
scale on the set of (ﬁnite) alternatives. We say now that f is strategy-proof ig
there exist bounded compensation functions qi :
Qn
i=1 Xi $ E,;i 5
N, such that3 ;i 5 N, ;b w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi, ;wi 5 Xi,
vi(f(wi,b w3i),wi)+qi(wi,b w3i)  vi(f(b wi,b w3i),wi)+qi(b wi,b w3i)( 1 )
Roberts proved that whenever range(f)=K, the only strategy-proof social












where F : K $ E is any
bounded real-valued function.
3There is no dierence in the interpretation of Robert’s deﬁnition of strategy-proofness
from the deﬁnition above provided that we realise that there are now two ways in which
the planner can aect the agents’ ﬁnal payo (and hence their incentives): via the chosen
alternative (aecting the v0
is) and by varying the compensations (that only depend on the
revealed proﬁle), that is the direct way of changing the ﬁnal payos.
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Case 3 Groves-Clarke’s mechanisms. (Groves [6], [7] and [8],C l a r k e[2],
Green & Lagont [5]).
L e tu sc o n s i d e ra ne c o n o m ys u c ht h a tK is now some compact set in a
topological space. Let the real-valued bounded v0
is in the above framework
for all wi 5 Xi be the set of all bounded upper-semi-continuous or continu-
ous functions. The list of compensation functions (mechanism) {q1,...,qn}
implement by revelation the SCC KW ig for every selection f from KW, i.e.,
f(b w) 5 KW(b w) ;b w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi, (1) holds.4
Green & Lagont [5] proved that the only mechanisms that implement the
SCC KW(w)= a r gm a x
Pn
i=1 vi(k,wi)
s.t. k 5 K
are the Groves’ mechanisms5,
i.e., those mechanisms in which all the compensation functions take the form:
;i 5 N, qi(b w)=
X
j6=i vj(f(b w),b wj)+hi(b w3i), ;f(b w) 5 K
W(b w)( 2 )
where hi :
Q
j6=i Xj $ E is any real-valued function independent of b wi.
Later research (Green & Lagont [5], Walker [15] and Hurwicz & Walker
[11]) proved that Groves’ mechanisms cannot generically balance the budget,
that is, ;{q1,...,q n} implementing by revelation the SCC above, ;k 5 E, Pn
i=1 qi(b w) 6= k ;b w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi.
The three implementation scenarios described above share some common
properties:
(i). The domains of private characteristics are quite large in each model.
(ii). The incentive compatibility requirement is actually the same in all
cases and amounts to the existence of truth-revealing dominant strategies.
(iii). The implementable social choice rules or functions in the three cases
require that individuals’ objectives are made somehow similar to social objec-
tives. Gibbard does not allow for extra-model compensations that can agect
the agents’ objectives but not the planner’s utility -any SWF representing
the SCC-, so he obtains that implementability should make the social ob-
jectives be identiﬁed with those of some ﬁxed agent -the dictator-. Roberts,
in his turn, allows for monetary or quasi-linear compensations in the mech-
anism design, but the only social choice functions that are implementable
come from the maximization of some linear combination of the individuals’
valuation functions -some quasi-linear or utilitarian social objectives-. Green
4Again, there is no dierence between the notions of strategy-proofness in Roberts’
setup and the notion of mechanisms implementing by revelation a SCF.
5We use the names ”Groves-Clarke’s mechanisms” and ”Groves’ mechanisms” as syn-
onims.
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&L a gont actually work in the same framework of Roberts, but they are in-
terested in implementing the utilitarian social welfare function -the sum of
all the agents’ valuation functions- and using quasi-linear individual objec-
tives. Notice that the Groves’ compensation functions -the only mechanisms
working in that domain- somehow replicate the social objectives in the sense
that if the planner delegate the outcome selection in any agent, he would
actually pick up the same social alternatives that would be chosen by the
planner himself.
T h ea n a l o g i e ss h o w e da b o v eg i v er i s et oac o n j e c t u r et h a tm i g h tb ef o r -
malized as follows:
Conjecture 1 Truthful implementation in large domains of SCC KW re-
quires that ;i 5 N, for all admissible functions Pi : E2 $ E, the following
holds: ;wi,b wi 5 Xi,;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(f(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = W(f(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i). (3)
for some W 5 W(KW).
It is not dicult to check that the three results summarized above are
particular cases of the above statement -or can be written in these terms-.
We shall then raise the following questions: Is that a common feature of
all truthful implementation problems in large domains?. How far can this
conjecture be extended? Is it valid for every compensation scheme, even for
those not restricted to quasi-linear compensations?
We ﬁnd that there exists a requirement on the social choice rule called
individual decisiveness, under which truthful implementation demands
social and individual objectives to coincide in the above sense. This prop-
erty assumes a strong responsiveness of the social choices to changes on the
individual types. Examples will be provided later, but let us point out now
that individual decisiveness holds for the usual social choice rules when al-
lowing suciently rich domains. In particular, it holds and plays a crucial
role in environments admitting Groves’ type mechanisms.
The main result in this paper shows the strong connection between the
speciﬁca g e n t s ’p a y o g function structure and the individually decisive social
choice rules that can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies. In
other words, the compensations allowed in any mechanism should be such
that they have to allow that the payog function structure replicates some
social welfare function representing the social choice rule. In other words,
we should give to the agents exactly the same incentive scheme that the one
implied in the social welfare function; the objective function of agents and
that of society should somehow coincide.
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3 Compensation mechanisms
We shall propose a general model, including the setups for the examples of
the preceding section as particular cases. Case 1 (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem) occurs in a setup which is traditional in social choice theory: al-
ternatives are deﬁned as those objects over which agents are assumed to have
preferences. Cases 2 and 3 (Robert’s and Groves-Clarke’s models) refer to
setups where social states are described through two sets of variables: the lev-
els of variables in the ﬁrst set are interpreted as the result of a public decision;
the levels of others are interpreted as transfers of goods or compensations to
agents. Individual payogs depend on the overall levels of both variables. If
we want to keep the conventions of social choice we should reserve the term
alternative to denote these combinations of levels, since it is on them that
agents have preferences. But it is more useful to keep the distinction found
in the other two models, and eventually to generalize it. Hence, we distin-
guish between those parts of a decision which involve a public decision (K)
and those (q) which can be interpreted as compensations for the agents. The
agent’s valuations of the public decisions will be assumed to be well deﬁned
as functions of their types, and the overall preferences of agents over public
decisions and compensation levels are assumed to take a quite ﬂexible form.
This will make our setup more general than any of those mentioned above.
Let us consider any economy e.G i v e ne,w ed e ﬁne the following:
Deﬁnition 1 A compensation mechanism {P,q} is the tuple deﬁned by
the following sets:
(i) P = {Pi,;i 5 N} is the set of payo functions6, where ;i 5
N, Pi : E2 $ E is a continuous upper-bounded real-valued function mono-
tonic in both arguments -and strictly monotonic in the second-, i.e.,
;x,x0,y,y0 5 E, y > y0 , Pi(x,y) >P i(x,y0) and x>x 0 , Pi(x,y) 
Pi(x0,y).
(ii) q = {qi,;i 5 N} is the list of compensation functions: ;i 5
N, qi :
Qn
i=1 Xi $ E, upper-bounded real-valued functions that serve the
planner to distribute utility among the agents based in the information con-
tained in the strategies.
Given a compensation mechanism, the ﬁnal payog that any individual
6These functions stand for the payos that the agents obtain, given their types -be it
a production function, a utility function or a general arbitrary type of agent-, and some
individual real argument which can be used within the mechanism in order to compensate
the agent.
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gets from any strategy vector is always given by the following expression:
;i 5 N, Zi(b w,wi)=Pi(vi(g(b w),wi),q i(b w)).
Therefore the functional form of the ﬁnal payog is partially given by the
mechanism and does not necessarily coincide with the valuation function, ex-
cept in the limit case of a mechanism such that ;i 5 N, ;x,yi 5 E, Pi(x,yi)=
x, which is not strictly monotonic in the second argument. The speciﬁcp a y -
og function structure will allow us to classify every compensation mecha-
nism. In order to illustrate this point, it will be useful to think about a
production economy: e is such that N is a set of ﬁrms, divisions within
a ﬁrm or productive agents that produce a single homogeneous good, K
represents either feasible levels of a public input used by the agents or dis-
tributions of a private input; let us assume that the set of types determines
the feasible technologies available such that the valuation function will be
a production function. Consider the following examples of particular payog
functions: ;x,yi 5 E, Pi(x,yi)=x, Pi(x,yi)=x + yi,P i(x,yi)=xyi,
and Pi(x,yi)=yi. Those payog functions imply ﬁnal payogso ft h ef o r m :
Zi = vi(g(b w),wi), Zi = vi(g(b w),wi)+qi(b w), Zi = vi(g(b w),wi)qi(b w), Zi = qi(b w)
respectively. The ﬁrst one represents the impossibility of compensating
agents. Agent i0s objective function is fully determined given by his own
private characteristic -or his produced output for given levels of the input-,
so it coincides with the usual implementation framework, where every possi-
ble compensation is modelled inside the set of feasible alternatives. We will
r e f e rt ot h i sc a s ea st h ecompensation free payog functions. In the second
example above, the productive agent sells his output at some given (unitary)
price and gets the proﬁt, but the planner or principal can only set some tax
or subsidy to provide an incentive for truthful behavior. This will be called
the compensation by transfers case. The third example assumes the ability
of the planner to set the ﬁnal price of the produced good according to some
pre-speciﬁed rule -compensation by prices-. Finally, in the last example the
agent has no property rights on the good produced, and he only receives a
w a g et h a tc a nd e p e n do nt h ei n f o r m a t i o nr e p o r t e db ya l lt h ea g e n t s . T h i s
will be the full compensation case. Notice that all the above examples allow
for digerent compensation or surplus-sharing schemes and the possibility of
one or another may be discretional to the planner in some contexts or given
by nature in others. Furthermore, the monotonicity property imposed on
the payog functions establishes a speciﬁc restriction on the functional form
of compensations, so that for any given allocation, the higher the compensa-
tion, the higher the ﬁnal payog. A non-monotonic payog function might be,
for example, the following one: Pi(x,y)=xy2
i. This condition does not seem
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to be too restrictive, since the speciﬁc nature of the compensation requires a
clear guide to reward the agents.
Finally, notice that the compensation functions can also be viewed as part
of the real alternatives, and we could deﬁne an extended set of alternatives
as: K0 = K×En, where compensations for all the agents are included within
the set of alternatives. Once the payog function structure is ﬁxed, it amounts
exactly to the usual framework of compensation free payog functions with the
agents’ valuations re-deﬁned to be: ;i 5 N, v0
i(k0,wi)=Pi(vi(k,wi),y i)a n d
k0 =( k,y1,..,yn), so the approach followed in most of the implementation
literature -see, for example, Green and Lago n t[ 5 ] -i sap a r t i c u l a rc a s eo fo u r
compensation mechanisms too.
Now we deﬁne the notion of truthful implementation that we shall use,
together with some additional deﬁnitions related to SCCs and mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 2 G i v e na ne c o n o m ye and a SCC KW, we say that a compensa-
tion mechanism {P,q} is an incentive compatible mechanism for i if
the following condition holds for i : ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(f(wi,b w3i),wi),q i(wi,b w3i))  Pi(vi(f(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)), (4)
and this for any selection f(b w) from KW(b w).
A compensation mechanism which is incentive compatible for all i 5 N is
said to be incentive compatible. If an incentive compatible mechanism exists
for some SCC we say that the mechanism implements by revelation that SCC.
The last deﬁnitions are natural generalizations of those in Green and
Lagont [5].
Deﬁnition 3 AS C CKW :
Q
iMN Xi $ K. is called individually decisive
for i ig
;w3i 5 X3i, ;k 5 K, <b wi 5 Xi 3 k 5 K
W(b wi,w3i).
A SCC that is individually decisive for all i is individually decisive and
any SWF which represents some individually decisive SCC will be individually
decisive.
This property means that individual i can force any alternative under
some circumstances to be in the choice set by declaring an appropriate char-
acteristic for any others’ types.
It may be useful to illustrate the above deﬁnitions with some examples
of both individually decisive and non-decisive SCCs.
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Example 1 Let the economy e be such that K is a compact set deﬁned
in a topological space and ;i 5 N, Xi includes all the bounded, upper-
semi-continuous functions on K. Let us consider the utilitarian welfare
function: W =
Pn
i=1 vi(k,wi). The SCC that maximizes W on K, i.e.,




, c a nb ep r o v e d( s e eProposition 2
later) to be individually decisive.
Example 2 The Pareto SCC is individually decisive when deﬁned on a large






k 5 K such that @k 5 K such that ;i 5 N, vi(k,wi)  vi(k,wi)
and vi(k,wi) >v i(k,wi) for some i 5 N
¾
.
Consider the unrestricted domain on K : ;i 5 N, Xi is such that ;k,l 5
K (l 6= k), <b wi 5 Xi such that vi(k,b wi) >v i(l,b wi) ,; k 5 K, <b wi 5 Xi such
that: k 5 PO(b wi,w3i)=KW(b wi,w3i).
Example 3 Consider now the Pareto SCC in an economy such that N =
{1,2} and the domain of all continuous, strictly monotonic and convex pref-
erence orderings over the 2-good commodity space E2
+ when the set K is the
set of all feasible allocations of the 2 goods available in ﬁxed ﬁnite amounts
between the two agents (the Edgeworth Box). Take any w2 5 X2 and any
feasible allocation z 5 K. Construct the agent 2’s upper contour set on
z : C2(z,w2)={y 5 Ks . t .v 2(y,w2)  v2(z,w2)}, and ﬁnd, for example,




s.t. x 5 C2(z,w2)
x 5 K
. This value will al-
ways exist because of the convexity and monotonicity assumptions on X1 and




2. This is a convex,
strictly monotonic and continuous function, so b w1 5 X1, a n db yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
z 5 PO(b w1,w2)=KW(b w1,w2).
Example 4 In an economy like that in Example 3, The Walrasian corre-
spondence with respect to some vector of initial endowments can be proved to
be an individually decisive SCC by using a similar argument.
Example 5 Let us assume an economy such that n  3 is odd, K is a
closed interval of the real line K =[ 0 ,1]  E and the agents’ types are such
that the agents may have every continuous single-peaked valuation function,
i.e., ;i 5 N, Xi is such that ;wi 5 Xi, <k(wi) 5 Ks . t . v i(k(wi),wi) >
vi(k,wi) ;k 5 K\k(wi)&;k
0,k
00 5 K (k
0 >k
00),
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, where the function ”med”s t a n d sf o rt h em e d i a no ft h er e -
vealed peaks of the agents, i.e., the peak such that leaves the same number
of other peaks on the right and on the left. This is a well-known selection of
the Pareto correspondence in this economy -see, for example, Moulin [12]-.
It is easy to see that there exist situations where some individuals cannot
individually change the decision, for example, individual i cannot even agect
the decision for w3i 5 X3i such that k(wj)=k(wh) ;j,h 6= i, so KW is not
individually decisive.
Example 6 Let us consider an economy e such that K =[ 0 ,1]  E+ and
;i 5 N, Xi = E+, and vi(k,wi)=aik 1
2k2 ;k 5 K,;ai 5 Xi. The utilitarian
SWF in Example 1 above is individually non-decisive, but it will be individ-
ually decisive if the economy is enlarged to allow for types such that Xi = E





We can now address the main question we face: what kind of compen-
sation mechanisms, if they exist, should we use in order to implement by
revelation any individually decisive SCC?. We provide a complete answer to
this question.
4M a i n r e s u l t
The results presented below hold true for every given economy
e = hN,K,Xi ;i 5 Ni.
Theorem 1 The only incentive compatible compensation mechanisms {P,q}
that implement by revelation an individually decisive SCC KW are such that:
;i 5 N, ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = W(g(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i),
for every selection g from KW.
In order to prove the theorem, we make use of the following intermediate
results:
Lemma 1 Let {P,q} be an incentive compatible for i compensation mecha-
nism implementing the SCC KW, a n dt a k et w o- p o s s i b l yt h es a m e -s e l e c t i o n s
from KW : g and b g. Then, ;wi,w
0
i 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, s.t. g(wi,w3i)=
b g(w
0
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i 5 Xi such that
b o t hy i e l dt h es a m eo u t c o m ew i t hb o t hs e l e c t i o n s :g(wi,w3i)=b g(w
0
i,w3i)=
k, and one of them leads to a bigger compensation: wi w.l.g., then: qi(wi,w3i) >
qi(w
0
i,w3i). Then, take type w
0
i, and consider the payogs:
Pi(vi(g(wi,w3i),w
0
















i). Then, by monotonicity of the pay-
og functions structure, we should have:
Pi(vi(g(wi,w3i),w
0









i, <wi 5 Xi, <w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <g(wi,w3i) 5 KW(wi,w3i) ;wi 5
Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, - a selection from KW-d e ﬁned as:
g(b wi,w3i)=
(





i,w3i) iff b wi = w
0
i










i,w3i)), so the mec
anism cannot be incentive compatible for i.7
Lemma 2 The only incentive compatible for i compensation mechanisms
{P,q} that implement by revelation any individually decisive for i SCC KW
a r es u c ht h a t :;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = W(g(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i),
for any selection g from KW.
Proof. Necessity ,)W es u p p o s et h a t{P,q} is an incentive compatible
for i compensation mechanism implementing by revelation some individually
decisive for i SCC KW.S i n c e KW is individually decisive for i, it is true
that ;w3i 5 X3i, ;k 5 K, <b wi(k,w3i) 5 Xi 3 k 5 KW(b wi,w3i). Hence, the
mapping b wi : K×
Q
j6=i Xj $$ Xi is well-deﬁned and for any selection wi from
that mapping, it holds that ;k 5 K,;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,k5 KW(wi(k,w3i),w3i).
Now, let us deﬁne the following mapping for individual i 5 N: b qi : K × Q





qi(wi(k,w3i),w3i), for any selection wi from b wi
o
. This map-
ping is well deﬁned and has the following properties:
i) range(b qi)=range(qi).
ii) dom(b qi)=K ×
Q
j6=i Xj.
7This lemma is a generalization of part of Green and Laont’s [5] Theorem 3.
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
centra E2003/12   14/3/03  17:54  Página 1112
iii) b qi is a real-valued function.
iv) ;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, b qi(g(wi,w3i),w3i)=qi(wi,w3i), for any
selection g from KW.
Property (i) is obvious by deﬁnition: for any wi 5 Xi, <k = g(wi,w3i), so
qi(wi,w3i) 5 b qi(k,w3i). (ii) holds because b wi is a well-deﬁned mapping from
K×
Q
j6=i Xj. Property (iii) holds because we are in the conditions of applying
Lemma 1:S i n c e{P,q} is an incentive compatible for i compensation mech-





5 Xi s.t. g(wi,w3i)=b g(w
0
i,w3i)=k for two -possibly the same- selec-
tions from KW , qi(wi,w3i)=qi(w
0
i,w3i). Thus, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, ;k 5 K,
qi(wi(k,w3i),w3i)=qi(e wi(k,w3i),w3i) for any two arbitrary elections wi and
e wi from b wi and hence a single real number is associated to each k 5 K in the
function b qi(k,w3i).
Finally, property (iv) is straightforward by deﬁnition and (iii).
Now, we know by assumption that {P,q} is an incentive compatible com-
pensation mechanism for i,s ot h a ti th o l d st h a t :







i 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj and this for any selection g(wi,w3i) 5
KW(wi,w3i).
Now, using iv), we can state the following:







i 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj
and for any selection g(wi,w3i) 5 KW(wi,w3i).
Then, since KW is individually decisive by hypothesis, we can choose the
following selection e g(w
0
i,w3i)f r o mKW:G i v e n a n y w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj and any
















where wi(k) is any selection fromb wi and g(w
0
i,w3i) is any arbitrary selection
from KW. It holds for this selection that: ;wi,w
0
i 5 Xi,
Pi(vi(e g(wi,w3i),wi), b qi(e g(wi,w3i),w3i)) 
Pi(vi(e g(w
0
i,w3i),wi), b qi(e g(w
0
i,w3i),w3i)). (3). But this is true for all w
0
i 5
Xi, which only agects the right hand side of the above inequality and, by




i 5 Xi} = K, so for each wi 5 Xi,we can write
(3) in the following way: given any wi and w3i, we can construct a selection
e g deﬁned above and obtain:
Pi(vi(g(wi,w3i),wi), b qi(g(wi,w3i),w3i))  Pi(vi(k,wi), b qi(k,w3i)) ;k 5 K. (4
But g(wi,w3i)f o re a c hwi 5 Xi is selected arbitrary from KW(wi,w3i), while
t h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h ea b o v ei n e q u a l i t yi st h es a m ef o re a c hs e l e c t i o n
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given wi and w3i, so statement (4) holds for every selection from KW(wi,w3i).
Abusing notation, we can write (4) as follows:
;wi 5 Xi,
Pi(vi(KW(wi,w3i),wi), b qi(KW(wi,w3i),w3i))  Pi(vi(k,wi), b qi(k,w3i)) ;k 5
K. (5).
Now, let us consider the following composite function b Pi : K×
Qn
i=1 Xi $
E deﬁned as: ;k 5 K, ;w 5
Qn
j=1 Xj, b Pi(k,wi,w3i)=Pi(vi(k,wi), b qi(k,w3i)),
(6), which is well-deﬁned when KW is individually decisive. Notice that (5)
can be written -slightly abusing notation again- as:
;k 5 K, ;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, b Pi(KW(wi,w3i),wi,w3i)  b Pi(k,wi,w3i).
B u tt h i sl a s te x p r e s s i o ni st h ed e ﬁnition of some SWF representing SCC
KW. In other words, let us suppose that b Pi / 5 W(KW). This can only be
true when <wi 5 Xi, <e w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <e k 5 K such that b Pi(e k,wi,e w3i) >
b Pi(KW(wi,e w3i),wi,e w3i)( 7 ) .B u t s i n c e KW is individually decisive for i,f o r
e w3i there exist <e wi 5 Xi such that e k 5 KW(e wi,e w3i). Substituting this into (7),
we have found a selection of KW such that, slightly abusing notation again,
<e wi 5 Xi (e wi 6= wi), <wi 5 Xi, <e w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, such that
b Pi(KW(e wi,e w3i),wi,e w3i) > b Pi(KW(wi,e w3i),wi,e w3i), a n d ,w h i c hb y( 6 )c a nb e
written again as: Pi(vi(KW(e wi,e w3i),wi),e w3i) >P i(vi(KW(wi,e w3i),wi),e w3i), and
this clearly contradicts mechanism {P,q} to be incentive compatible for i.
Hence, it has to be that b Pi 5 W(KW) and the existence is proved.
Suciency +) Now we have to prove that every mechanism such that
;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, can be written as Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) =
W(g(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i), (1) is an incentive compatible for i compensation mech-





i 5 Xi such that W(g(w
0
i,e w3i),e wi,e w3i) >W(g(e wi,e w3i),e wi,e w3i)( 3 ) .B u t ,
since W represents KW,i tm u s tb et h a t;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, ;k 5
K, W(g(wi,w3i),wi,w3i)  W(k,wi,w3i), and, in particular,
W(g(e wi,e w3i),e wi,e w3i)  W(k,e wi,e w3i) (4). take any k = g(w
0
i,e w3i) 5 K,
and (3) and (4) imply:
W(g(w
0
i,e w3i),e wi,e w3i) >W (g(e wi,e w3i),e wi,e w3i)  W(g(w
0
i,e w3i),e wi,e w3i), a
contradiction, so {P,q} is an incentive compatible compensation mechanism
for i and the lemma is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Using Lemma 2 and applying it for all i, it holds trivially.
The implications of Theorem 1 are wide: It shows, for example, that
when the social objectives are ﬂexible enough, like the set of all continuous
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preferences on some compact set of alternatives, and we are trying to im-
plement selections of the Pareto-optimal correspondence, which is clearly an
individually decisive SCC, we must make coincide social interest with every
individual’s to achieve a positive result. Notice that this is a generalization
of the well-known Groves’ mechanisms: Green & Lagont’s [5] result can be
seen as a corollary of this one, and, moreover, it shows that the only restric-
tion on preferences that allow for ecient and strong incentive compatible
implementation are the quasi-linear domain.
5 Applications
In what follows, we will be concerned with digerent applications of Theo-
rem 1 in digerent contexts that ﬁt their assumptions. We will show that a
wide range of interesting economic environments match in our general model
and our result will be very useful to characterize the mechanisms and social
choice rules that are implementable. We proceed to classify the digerent
applications by the kind of compensation mechanism allowed.
5.1 Compensation-free schemes
Corollary 1 T h eo n l yi n d i v i d u a l l yd e c i s i v ef o ri SCCs that can be imple-
mented by means of compensation mechanisms when the payog function
structure is compensation-free is the dictatorial one.
Proof. The compensation-free payog function structure is not actually
monotonic, but we do not need monotonicity to hold in this special case.
Following the reasoning in Theorem 1,i ti se a s yt os e et h a tLemma 1 is not
necessary to prove that Theorem 1 holds in this particular context, so the
only compensation mechanism that implements by revelation any individu-
ally decisive for i SCC is such that the following holds: ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi)=W(g(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i)
for any W 5 W(KW). So we can only implement the SWF that represents the
characteristic of individual i, and whatever any other individual reports, the
SCC will be: KW(wi,w3i)= argmax vi(k,wi)
k
;w3i 5 X3i, i.e., individual i
is a dictator.
Corollary 1 is a stronger version of Gibbard-Satterthwaite famous The-
orem since we are imposing additional restrictions on the SCC to get the
result -the SCC or SCF should be individually decisive for i-, which is a
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much stronger assumption that Gibbard’s condition -the range of the func-
tion contains at least three elements-. It is also related with Barber` a-Peleg’s
[1] version when considering continuous preferences and with Theorem 3.2
in Roberts [13], but the case of compensation-free payog functions becomes
trivial in our framework8 and the reason for considering this case here is to
compare the gains from the possibilities of digerent compensation schemes
below with the radical result of not allowing any kind of compensation.
Corollary 2 Consider any economy where Xi, ;i 5 N a r es u c ht h a t<i,j 5





Then, there does not exist any individually decisive SCC that can be imple-
mented by revelation by a compensation-free mechanism.
Proof. Trivial: There cannot be more than one dictator when extending
Corollary 1 to more agents.
The compensation-free scheme is also interesting because usual mecha-
nisms in the literature do not allow for compensations that are not included
in the set of feasible alternatives. If this is the case and the planner cares
about the whole payog that the agents receive, our approach remains valid if
we restrict the analysis to the compensation-free scheme. Notice that Theo-
rem 1 hold for the compensation-free case, and this will allow us to deal with
the problem of balance -omitted until now- and provide a partial answer to an
important question posed by Hurwicz &Walker [11]: Does an incentive com-
patible mechanism implementing the Pareto-optimal SCC exist for the mixed
economy -public and private goods- when we drop the quasi-linear payogs
assumption?. In their own words, ”First, there is no reason to believe that
[their result] depends upon the quasi-linearity of the individual’s preferences;
however, it is not clear how to obtain the result without the quasi-linearity
assumption.” The former authors could not directly face that problem be-
cause they used a characterization theorem due to Holmstrom which only
holds for those payogs, but we will show in what follows that our previous
results are actually a powerful tool to deal with the general problem.
L e tu sc o n s i d e rap a r t i c u l a ra n ds i m p l i ﬁed 2-agents mixed economy. There





4, be some compact interval on the real line representing the quantity pro-
vided of the public good and let X = Y × X1 × X2 be the consumption
8Note that Barber´ a & Peleg’s [1] proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem consists in
proving that strategy-proofness alone in an unrestricted domain of preferences makes the
SCF either individually decisive for each agent or invariant to changes of his type.
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space in the economy, standing for the public good and the private good
each individual can get. A particular element from X will be denoted by
x =( y,x1,x 2). We will identify X1  X2  E+ for simplicity and consider a
ﬁxed ﬁnite quantity x>0 of the private good to be distributed among the
individuals. Let T = {(x1,x 2) 5 X1 × X2 s.t. x1 + x2  x} be the feasibility
constraint on the private good, so assuming that both goods are technologi-
cally independent, the set of feasible alternatives will be: FA X_(Y × T).
Both agents are endowed with preferences representable by a continuous util-
ity function: ui : Y × Xi $ E, for i =1 ,2, deﬁned on his agective space
- in Hurwicz &Walker’s [11] terminology -. We suppose the functions to be
strictly increasing in the quantity of the private good and not quasi-linear:
;i =1 ,2, ;y,b y 5 Y, ui(y,xi)ui(b y,xi)=ui(y,e xi)ui(b y,e xi) , xi = e xi. The
set of these admissible preferences will be Xi,i=1 ,2. The reason why we
completely exclude quasi-linear preferences on the domain is that Hurwicz
&Walker [11] proved a similar theorem only for this kind of preferences. If
we admit them into our new domain, the impossibility result becomes trivial
and has no interest.
Proposition 1 Consider the above economy. There does not exist any in-
centive compatible compensation-free mechanism implementing the Pareto-
optimal correspondence.
Proof. First of all, notice that we do not need to focus on the whole
Pareto-optimal correspondence since incentive compatibility requires that
every selection correspondence must satisfy it. Let us take the following
selection correspondence of the Pareto-optimal rule:
b KW(w1,w2) = argmax v1(y,x1,w1)+v2(y,x2,w2)
x 5 FA
. Now we will con-
sider a quite narrower subdomain of characteristics belonging to Xi ;i =





y2. Notice that b Xi  Xi ;i =1 ,2, since all of them
are continuous, strictly increasing on the private good and no quasi-linear.
Hence, incentive compatibility holds within this subdomain too. But we can
prove that b KW is individually decisive for both agents. First, notice that since
the utility functions are strictly increasing in the private good, every allo-
cation in the whole Pareto-optimal SCC -and, of course, any selection from
this- distributes the total amount available of the good among the agents, so
if agent 1 can secure any y 5 Y and any amount 0 <x 1 < x for himself
by declaring an appropriate type, he can actually select some Pareto-optimal
alternative, since x2 = x  x1 in any ecient allocation. Thus, we prove
the following, i.e., for individual 1, ;y 5 Y, x1 5 X1 & x1  x,;w2 5
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b X2, <b w1 5 b X1 3 (y,x1,x  x1) 5 b KW(b w1,w2) 5 FA. We can easily ﬁnd



















(a1 + a2)(b1 + b2)
,y
¾
if (b1 + b2) > 0
yo t h e r w i s e
Now, take individual 1: ;a2 > 0, ;b2 5 E, ;x1 s.t. x>x 1 > 0, ;y 5







b a1a2x  (b a1 + a2)b2y
(b a1 + a2)
5 E, s.t. b xW
1(b a1,a 2)=x1 & b yW(b a1,a 2,b b1,b 2)=
y. The fact that each agent cannot achieve the extremes - everything or
nothing - of the total endowment of the private good prevent it to be indi-
vidually decisive in the whole K, but it is clear that he can get quantities of
the private good as close as desired to both extremes.
Henceforth, applying Theorem 1 and taking into account that we only al-
low for compensation-free mechanisms, we have that agent 10s valuation func-
tion should be of the form: v1(g(b w1,b w2),w1)=W(g(b w1,b w2),w1,b w2), ;w1,b w1 5
b X1, ;b w2 5 b X2, for any selection g from b KW.S i n c ev1(y,x1,w1)+v2(y,x2,w2)i s
at w i c ed i gerentiable function -and concave for a large range of parameters-,
the following equation has to hold for any W 5 W( b KW) within that range of
parameters:












And some simple calculations show that











1  b1yW 6= a1xW2
1  b1yW b b2yW for all
b b2 6=0 , so the impossibility is proved.
The former proposition provides strong evidence about the non-existence
of truthful revelation mechanisms for mixed economies that both generically
provide the ecient quantities of the public and private goods and balance
the budget when we limit ourselves to domains of preferences or characteris-
tics with some income egect, so the income egect cannot be generically used
9Note that PO() in this case requires some positive amount of the private good to be
given to both agents, so that this SCC can be shown to be individually decisive for the
set K restricted to xi > 0 ;i 5 {1,2}. To apply our result to the whole closed set K we
need some continuity assumptions, which is the problem we shall tackle in the Appendix.
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to enforce strong implementation. Nevertheless, slightly digerent domains
might lead to digerent implementation results, so the general question of ex-
istence is still open. Notice, for example, that the former proof is not valid
with the additional restriction of concavity imposed on the preferences for
the public good.
Moreover, when more than 2 agents are present, we may ﬁnd that in some
contexts, the SCC is not individually decisive, but it is for some ﬁxed subset
of the feasible alternatives -the individual consumption spaces, but not the
others’ consumptions-. In those cases, although we cannot directly apply
the results in the former section, we can reﬁne them to get useful tools to
deal with those problems. For example, the following straightforward lemma
might be applied:
Lemma 3 Let Ki, ;i 5 N, be a family of compact and convex sets. Let
vi : Ki×Xi $ E be the continuous valuations for each individual and charac-
teristic and suppose KW
i (w1,..,wn) be the restriction of KW :
Qn
i=1 Xi $^ n
i=1Ki
on Ki. If KW
i is individually decisive on Ki for some i, the only compensation-
free mechanism that implements KW should be such that: ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj,v i(gi(b wi,b w3i),wi)=W(gi(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i), and for any selection g
from KW. (where gi stands for the restriction of any g on Ki).
The proof of this lemma is omitted since it follows strictly the same
reasoning of that in Theorem 1 with the digerence of considering Ki as the
whole set K in the proof.
We can explore now the ecient implementation problem with compensatio
f r e em e c h a n i s m si nt h ee x t r e m ec a s e so fp u r ep u b l i cg o o d sa n dp r i v a t eg o o d s .
Consider the public good case: depending on the admissible domain of char-
acteristic we may choose, we can easily check if the Pareto-optimal SCC is
individually decisive. For example, if we focus on the unrestricted domain
of characteristics -see Example 2 in the ﬁrst section-, we can apply Corol-
lary 2 to get a strong version of Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility result.
For the case of private goods, the strategy is similar: Let us consider, for
example, the 2-agents, 2-goods general environment in Example 3,w h i c hi s
the classical Edgeworth Box economy, where the admissible characteristics
are all continuous, strictly monotonic and convex utility functions over the
2-goods commodity space E2
+. If we want to implement the Pareto-optimal
SCC by means of compensation-free mechanisms, and it has been shown to
be an individually decisive SCC, we can apply Theorem 1 a n do b t a i nas i m -
ilar impossibility to that in Proposition 1 for the mixed economy close to
that of Hurwicz [10]. Nevertheless, there is a digerence that we should point
out: Our work always assumes full implementation, since every selection
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of the SCC has to yield every individual’s highest payog,s ow h e nt h es e t
of possible social choices is large -as in the case of private goods along the
contract curve, it is easier to get an impossibility result and there might be
selections of the SCC that can be implemented by revelation in a partial
implementation framework-. As an example, consider the Pareto-optimal
SCC when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences in Ex-
ample 4’s economy in Section 3: The whole Pareto-optimal SCC with that
domain is individually decisive, so it is easy to prove that there do not exist
compensation-free mechanisms implementing it, but there are selections from
this characterized by Moulin [12] -the SCF in the example is one of them-
such that are not individually decisive and can be implemented by revelation.
Finally, we should note that the compensation mechanisms reproducing
social objectives can be useful even in the absence of individual decisiveness.
For some quasi-linear preferences in public goods environments, it is possible
to achieve complete eciency in the mixed economy using some particular
Groves’ mechanism if we restrict the domain even more. Groves and Loeb [9]
found that the quadratic family of valuation functions on some public good
in Example 6 in Section 3, joint with quasi-linear preferences on the private
good can be balanced with an appropriate Groves’ mechanism, so that the
ecient choice of the public good can be implemented by revelation for that
domain. Notice, however, that this result does not enters into contradiction
with Corollary 1, since balanced implementation requires some appropriate
compensation functions (transfers) and only this selection of the Pareto-
optimal rule is implemented. Since a part of these transfers only depends on
the others’ reported types, no individual can get any transfer irrespective of
the others’ strategies, so the implementable Pareto-optimal selection is not
individually decisive in the part of the private good so Corollary 1 does not
apply.
5.2 Full compensation scheme
Corollary 3 When the payog function structure is that of full compensa-
tion, i.e., ;x,yi 5 E, Pi(x,yi)=yi, every SCC can be trivially implemented
by revelation by means of some compensation mechanism.
Proof. Consider an incentive compatible compensation mechanism with
full compensation payog functions for every agent; it is easy to check that
these payog functions are monotonic, so applying Theorem 1,e v e r yi n d i -
vidually decisive SCC implementable by revelation is such that: ;i 5 N,
;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
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W(g(b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i)) = Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = qi(b wi,b w3i). Notic
that the implementable SWF admitted in the full compensation case cannot
depend on the real individual characteristics, so every SWF allowed is such
that: W(k,w)=f(k) ;w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi, where f : K $ E is any function.
But, what kind of SCCs are represented by such SWFs? The only class
is the following: <K  K such that ;w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi,K W(w)=K. Even
though many members in that class are trivial undesirable SCCs like all the
cases where K is a singleton, the case K  K includes every possible social
choice function as a selection from KW. Moreover, we can say more about the
form of the compensation functions: since qi(b wi,b w3i) 5 E ;b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj, incentive compatibility implies the following: ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q





, qi(wi,b w3i)  max qi(b wi,b w3i)
(b wi,b w3i) 5
Qn
i=1 Xi
;wi 5 Xi,,; wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
qi(wi,b w3i)=qi(b wi,b w3i), or, in other words, ;i 5 N, ;b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj,q i(b wi,b w3i)=qi(b w3i). The compensation mechanisms associated to
those compensation functions with the full compensation payog function
structure are independent of each own’s reported type, so they are always
incentive compatible and (trivially) implement every SCC -not only the indi-
vidually decisive SCCs-. Notice that for this trivial compensation functions,
Theorem 1 assigns the constant SWF, which trivially represents any SCC.
Notice that both the compensation-free and full compensation schemes
are extreme or polar compensation mechanisms with opposite implementa-
tion properties: The impossibility of compensations makes the agents’ payog
fully depending on their characteristics, so they are strongly interested in ex-
ploiting their private information, while if the agents’ payog can be designed
independently of their types, any compensation scheme for an agent such
that makes no use of his reported private information works. The reason is
that in the full compensation case, the planner (or principal) owns the total
power to modify the agent’s payog against changes in the characteristics,
while in the no compensation scheme he can only use his discretion about
the selected alternative, and ﬁnally there will only be strong implementation
possibilities if the planner himself behaves as a dictatorial agent. Neverthe-
less, this trivial case has a clearly undesirable property: the agents have no
incentives to lie, but they have not an incentive to tell the truth either. For
a discussion of a similar setup, see Groves [7].
The remainder of this section studies some speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t ec a s e s
between the full compensation and the no compensation possibilities.
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5.3 Compensations with transfers
Proposition 2 Let K be some compact set in a topological space and Xi be
the set of all upper semi-continuous functions ;i 5 N, t h eo n l yi n c e n t i v ec o m -













;i 5 N, ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, where W is any SWF representing
the SCC in brackets.
Proof. It suces to prove that under the above condition, the SWF W
is individually decisive.




j6=i Xj;a se v e r y w
0
j 5 Xj ;j 5 N, is
bounded above by assumption, then, for any k 5 K, take the following












j) if k 6= k
which is clearly upper


















;k 6= k 5 K. This clearly implies that k 5 KW(b wi,w
0
3i), so for any ;k 5
K ;w
0
3i 5 X3i <b wi 5 Xi s.t. k 5 KW(b wi,w
0
3i), so the SWF is individually
decisive, because we can do the same for any i 5 N.
Then, we are under the conditions of Theorem 1, so the only compensation
mechanisms implementing by revelation W is of the form described above.
Proposition 3 Let K be some compact set in a topological space and the set
Xi be the set of all continuous functions ;i 5 N, t h eo n l yi n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l e
compensation mechanisms that implement the SWF: W =
Pn
i=1 vi(k,wi), are
t h es a m eo ft h o s ei nProposition 2.
Proof. We must prove that the SWF W is individually decisive even
when we restrict the domain of types to be continuous. Consider, then, for




j6=i Xj, the following char-
acteristic: vi(k,b wi)=z





j) b 0(k).z 5 E+, & b 0(k)
being any continuous function such that: b 0(k)  0 ;k 5 K & b 0(k)=0 . We
can prove that the SWF. with the proﬁle (b wi,w
0
3i)g e tam a x i m u mo nk = k :
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j6=i vj(k,wj)b 0(k)=b 0(k) > b 0(k)
z











° °k  k




Notice that vi(k,b wi) is continuous since every vj(k,w
0
j) ;j 6= i are con-
tinuous, so we conclude as before, that W is individually decisive. Applying
Theorem 1, we can get the Generalized Groves’ mechanisms again, being this
a second generalization of Green & Lagont’s results.
Proposition 4 Let K  Em be an open set endowed with the euclidean
metric for m  2 and the set Xi be the set containing all concave or strictly
concave and digerentiable functions ;i 5 N; the only incentive compatible
compensation mechanisms that implement the SWF W =
Pn
i=1 vi(k,wi) are
the same that those in Proposition 2.
Proof. We show that W has to be individually decisive even when the
domain of characteristics is restricted to be every concave -or strictly concave-
and digerentiable function: First, consider any i 5 N, and for any k 5
K, given any w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, since every vj(k,wj) ;j 5 N is a digerentiable
function, the expression:
P
j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj)) is digerentiable, so we





j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj))  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)
¯ ¯ ¯
° °k  k
° ° =0 . Now,









j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj))  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)
¯ ¯ ¯
° °k  k
° ° if k 6= k.
0 if k = k
Again, this number exists because all the vj(k,wj) are always bounded
above and the denominator is positive, so 0 < b h(k,w3i) < 4. Finally, we




j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj))  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)
¯ ¯ ¯
° °k  k
° ° ;k 5 K.
Rearranging the above inequality, we have:
b h(k,w3i)




j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj))  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)
¯ ¯ ¯ 

P
j6=i(vj(k,wj)  vj(k,wj))  l(k,w3i)0(k  k). ,
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b h(k,w3i)





j6=i vj(k,wj)  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)
;k 5 K, and ﬁnally, multiplying the inequality by 1, and rearranging
terms, we have:
P
j6=i vj(k,wj)  b h(k,w3i)
° °k  k
° °  l(k,w3i)0(k  k)+ P
j6=i vj(k,wj)
;k 5 K. (1). So, we proved that ;i 5 N, ;k 5 K, ; w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
<b h(k,w3i) < 4 such that the last expression holds for all k 5 K. Now,
deﬁne the following characteristic for individual i:
vi(k,e wi)=e h(k,w3i)
° °k  k
° °l(k,w3i)0(k k). Notice that vi(k,e wi)=
0 and it is easy to see that e wi 5 Xi, since e h(k,w3i)a n dl(k,w3i)e x i s ta n di t
is a digerentiable function - it is the sum of two digerentiable functions - and
is concave since the euclidean norm is strictly convex and the second term is
convex. (kbx +( 1 b)yk  kbxk+k(1  b)yk = |b|kxk+|(1  b)|kyk ;b 5
[0,1], ;x,y 5 K. ). Now, the only thing to do is interpreting expression
(1) as follows:
;k 5 K, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <e h(k,w3i) < 4, <l(k,w3i) 5 En, <e wi 5






° °k  k






;k 5 K , vi(k,e wi)+
P
j6=i vj(k,wj)  vi(k,e wi)+
P
j6=i vj(k,wj) ;k 5 K ,
;i 5 N, ;k 5 K, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <e wi 5 Xi such that W(k,e wi,w3i) 
W(k,e wi,w3i) , k 5 KW(e wi,w3i).
So there exists some characteristic in the admissible domain such that
any individual can get any alternative for any others’ characteristics, which
is the deﬁnition of an individually decisive SCC. Applying Theorem 1,w e
ﬁnd the same class of mechanisms as above.
Corollary 4 (Green & Lagont [5]). Let K be a compact set in a topological
space and Xi ;i 5 N contain any upper semi-continuous or continuous or
concave and digerentiable valuation functions. The only compensation by
transfers mechanisms that can implement by revelation the utilitarian SWF
are the Groves’ mechanisms.
In any of the possible domains considered, the only compensation mecha-
nisms that can implement by revelation the utilitarian SWF are of the same
form using Propositions 2 to 4, i.e.,
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;i 5 N, ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, where W is any SWF representing
the SCC in brackets.
Now, we are imposing an additional restriction to the compensation mech-
anisms allowed: we are only interested in compensations by transfers, i.e., the
payog functions structure have the form: ;x,yi 5 E, Pi(x,yi)=x + yi, so,
applying Propositions 2 to 4:









= vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi)+f(g(b wi,b w3i),b w3i)),
;i 5 N, ;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, where f is some adequate
function, so it suces to prove that
P
j6=i vj(g(b wi,b w3i),b wj)+hi(w3i)=
= f(g(b wi,b w3i),b w3i)) ;i 5 N, ;b w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi, where hi(w3i)i sa n yr e a l
valued function, which is the only functional form allowed -see Green &
Lagont [5]-.
Notice that the Groves’ mechanisms are a particular case of those com-
pensation mechanisms in the case of interpreting the model as choosing some
vector of public goods. Notice that in Propositions 2 to 4, we did not assume
the quasi-linearity of the ﬁnal payog function, which will be interpreted in our
context as allowing only for compensations by transfers, which is a particular
member of the family of payog function structures, so this propositions are
stronger than Green & Lagont’s Theorem in the sense that concluding that
the only form of the utility function on both private and public goods that
allows for the implementability of the utilitarian SWF is exactly the domain
imposed by the former authors, i.e., the quasi-linear preferences without any
income egect. Notice, also, that only under this restriction on the domain
of extended preferences the SWF as representing the Pareto optimal SCC
makes complete sense.
An important feature of the model that should be pointed out is that
Green and Lagont’s results, as well as ours, are extremely dependent on
the non-existence of a common ﬁxed bound on the types allowed in
the domain. Notice that if the planner possess the additional information
that the characteristics cannot be too high, the utilitarian SCC will not be
individually decisive. Suppose, for example, that the domain of types is
restricted to be all the bounded and continuous or upper semi-continuous
functions such that ;i 5 N, ;wi 5 Xi, <c,c 5 Es . t .;k 5 K, c  vi(k,wi) 
c. With this new restriction, for some w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, it is impossible to ﬁnd
E2003/12
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with this new domain, the utilitarian SWF is not individually decisive and
Theorem 1 cannot be applied. Take, for example, n =3 ,c=0 , c =1 , and
;j 6= i, vj(k,wj)=
½
1 fork  k.
0 otherwise.
Notice that for any wi 5 Xi, the
following holds: W(b k,wi,w3i)  2 > 1  W(e k,wi,w3i) ;b k  k, ;e k<k.
5.4 Compensations by means of prices
Consider the following particular problem: N = {1,2},
K =
©
(k1,k 2) 5 E2
+ s.t. k1 + k2 = k
ª
, ;w1 5 X1,v 1(k,w1)i ss u c h
that: ;(k1,k 2),(k1,b k2) 5 K, v1(k1,k 2,w1)= v1(k1,b k2,w1)&;wi 5
Xi, <(k1,k 2) 5 K such that: vi(k1,k 2,wi) > 0, ;i =1 ,2.
v1(k1,k 2,w1) is continuous and strictly increasing in the ﬁrst argument.
Agent 2’s characteristics will be of the same kind but permuting the argu-
ments of the set K. We will write them v1(k1,w1)a n d v2(k2,w2).
Proposition 5 The only incentive compatible compensation mechanisms that
implement by revelation the Nash SWF, i.e., W = v1(k,w1)v2(k,w2), are such
that: ;i 5 {1,2}, ;wi 5 Xi, ;wj 5 Xj, (j 6= i),
Pi(vi(g(b wi,b wj),wi),q i(b wi,b wj)) =





, where W is
any SWF such that W 5 W(KW).
Proof. We are going to prove that in the above economy, the Nash
bargaining SWF is, in fact, individually decisive. We show this for individual
1 and the proof for the other agent is, of course, symmetric.
Suppose any admissible type for individual 2: w2 5 X2, take any alterna-
tive from the range of the Nash SCC, i.e., the open set:
b K =
©
(k1,k 2) 5 E
2
+ s.t. k1k2 6=0 & k1 + k2 = k
ª
.
Notice that we cannot pick up alternatives with some zero component. Let us
call any of this b k =( b k1,b k2)=( b k1,k  b k1) 5 b K. Now, consider the following
characteristic for individual 1: for any w2 5 X2 declared by agent 2,
v1(k1,b w1)=2 v1(b k1,b w1) 
v1(b k1,b w1)
v2(b k2,w2)
v2(k  k1,w2).v 1(b k1,b w1)b e i n ga n y
positive real number. Let us call b q(b w1,w2) the absolute slope of the function
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. Notice that this is an admissible type for individual
1, because it is decreasing on k2 (increasing on k1)w h e n( k1,k 2) 5 b K, and
continuous since w2 is continuous. By using this strategy, the outcome of the
SWF will be the set:
KW(b w1,w2)= a r gm a x W = v1(k1,b w1)v2(k2,w2)
k1,k 2
s.t k1 + k2  k
. Suppose that (kW
1,kW
2) 5
KW(b w1,w2), it always holds that, if we deﬁne b uW







2)) = argmax W = b u1u2
b u1,u 2
s.t b u1 =2 v1(b k1,b w1)  b q(b w1,w2)u2
But the feasibility constraint is a linear function in the space (b u1,u 2), so
the solution will be unique and the necessary and sucient conditions that
hold in the optimum are the following:








= b q(b w1,w2)=
v1(b k1,b w1)
v2(b k2,w2)
(By deﬁnition of the
slope).
ii) b u1(kW
1)=2 v1(b k1,b w1)  b q(b w1,w2)u2(k  kW
1).
Notice that by construction, the ﬁrst tangency condition can only be
fulﬁlled in kW = b k, and the second holds for kW
1 = b k1 as well. Therefore, agent
1 has always some admissible strategy so that he can get any alternative he
wants with the exception of the extremes, but he can choose alternatives as
closed as desired to them (an alternative out of the range will make the slope
become inﬁnity) and always any alternative in range(KW), so the SWF is
individually decisive. Since the types are continuous functions, we can now
apply Theorem 1 and the conclusion is obvious.
This proposition posses its own interest since the above admissible domain
of characteristics can be interpreted as production sets of two ﬁrms that have
to share some ﬁxed amount of a common input. Both ﬁrms have private
information about his own technology and send their revealed technologic
characteristics to the planner or authority, which makes the ﬁnal sharing
decision. It shows that we can implement by revelation the Nash bargaining
solution even with lack of information if the authority can establish the prices
at which both ﬁrms sell their respective output. Therefore, we should use
some price payog structure to obtain it.
Corollary 5 Suppose w1,w2 5 X1,X2. Every individually decisive SCC can
E2003/12
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be trivially implemented by means of prices, i.e., when individual’s payog
functions are of the type:
Pi(vi(g(wi,w3i),wi),q i(wi,w3i)) = vi(g(wi,w3i),wi)qi(wi,w3i).
Proof. Obvious: just consider the following compensation functions:
qi(wi,w3i)=0;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i wj.
5.5 Other types of compensations
Now, we may wonder what other SWFs the planner could be interested to
implement. Thinking on some ethical and ecient rules, we can investigate
if there exists a method to implement some kind of equal welfare among the
agents.
Proposition 6 Let K be a compact set in a topological space and Xi be the
set of continuous or upper semi-continuous bounded functions. There does
not exist any incentive compatible compensation mechanism implementing by
revelation the Rawlsian SWF, i.e., W = min{v1(k,w1),v 2(k,w2),...,vn(k,wn)}
Proof. We prove that if the set of characteristics Xi ;i 5 N, are either
upper semi-continuous or continuous, the Rawlsian or egalitarian SWF rep-
resent an individually decisive SCC. Suppose that any individual i, and any
w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, set any k 5 K, and consider the real number cj 5 E be the
lower bound of each j 6= i, then, there exists the number b ci =m i n j6=i {cj} <
4, and, for any k 5 K, take the following type for individual i:
vi(k,b wi)=
½
b ci if k = k
b ci  1 if k 6= k
Notice that this is a bounded below,
upper semi-continuous function, and it holds by construction that:
min{v1(k,w1),...,vi31(k,wi31),v i+1(k,wi+1),...,vn(k,wn)}  min
j6=i
{cj} = b ci,
because every characteristic is bounded below by cj, so minj6=i {vj(k,wj)} 
b ci  vi(k,b wi) ;k 5 K. Consider now the problem:
max min
n
v1(k,w1),...,v i(k,b wi),...,v n(k,wn)
o
k 5 K
=m a x vi(k,b wi)
k 5 K
and observing the deﬁnition of vi(k,b wi),v i(k,wi)  vi(k,b wi) ;k 5 K, so
k 5 KW(k,b wi,w3i), and we can generate some vi(k,b wi) for every k 5 K, and
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every w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, so the Rawlsian SCC is individually decisive. The case
where Xi contains only continuous preferences does not diger very much
from this one: just consider instead of b wi 5 Xi, the following characteristic:




° °k  k
° ° for k s.t.
° °k  k
° °  1
b ci  1 otherwise.
And it is easy
to check that the function is continuous and individual i c a na t t a i na n y
alternative he wants just by changing k, ;k 5 K.
Now we can apply Theorem 1 in both cases and obtain: ;i 5 N, ;wi,b wi 5
Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),q i(b wi,b w3i)) = W((b wi,b w3i),wi,b w3i)=
f(min
n
vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),v 3i(g(b wi,b w3i),w3i)
o
), for any selection g from KW
and f being some function. But notice that the payog function structure as-







, for any W 5 W(KW). But all these are
non-monotonic payog functions: Suppose w 5
Qn
i=1 Xi such that <i 5 N such
that vi(k,wi) <v j(k,wj) ;k 5 K. Then, KW(w)= a r g m a x vi(k,wi)
k 5 K
and
the compensation cannot change. Suppose q 5 E, b wi 5 Xi such that: q>
vi(k,b wi), ;k 5 K, then, if we consider e q>q, we have e q>q>v i(k,b wi), and
the payog remains the same: Pi(vi(k,b wi),w)=Pi(vi(k,b wi),e w)=vi(k,b wi), a
contradiction with the monotonicity assumption, so there cannot exist com-
pensation mechanisms implementing the Rawlsian SWF under the conditions
above.
Corollary 6 The following compensation and non-monotonic mechanism al-
lows for implementation of the Rawlsian SCC in the above economy: ;wi,b wi 5
Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,





vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi),  max
j 6= i
n











vi(g(b wi,b w3i),wi), max
j 6= i
n
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= min
n
v1(g(b w),wi),...,v i(g(b w),wi),...,vn(g(b w),b wn)
o
. -of course the as-
sociated mechanism is not monotonic-. Abusing notation, we can write:
Pi(vi(g(wi,b w3i),wi),q i(wi,b w3i)) =
min
n





vi(g(b wi,b w3i),b wi),v 3i(g(b wi,b w3i),b w3i)
o
=
= Pi(vi(g(b wi,b w3i)),q i(b wi,b w3i))
;wi,b wi 5 Xi, ;b w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, and this for any selection g(b w)f r o m
KW(b w), so the non-monotonic compensation mechanism implements the Rawl-
sian SCC.
6 Concluding remarks
We have proved in this paper that when we are trying to implement by
revelation any SCC too sensitive to individual preferences,w eh a v et or e l y
on individual compensation mechanisms that replicate the social objectives.
This is the reason why the well-known Groves’ mechanism works in quasi-
linear domains of preferences, which can be viewed in terms of our model.
Hence, it is not by chance that the transfer any individual receives takes the
same functional form that the SWF we are trying to implement, but is a
general feature that can be extended to digerent social welfare criteria and
to digerent compensation schemes. Therefore, there exists a strong linkage
between the compensation structure we allow in each case and the social
welfare functions that we can implement. Essentially, we need an additive
transfer scheme -like taxes or subsidies- to implement the utilitarian SWF,
some multiplicative prices scheme to achieve the Nash bargaining solution,
and it is impossible within our assumptions to implement the egalitarian rule.
When the planner cannot make compensations, implementation by revela-
tion requires dictatorship or it is often impossible. In the opposite extreme,
when the planner can expropriate the part of the agents’ objective functions
agected by the type and completely determine the ﬁnal payog,e v e r ys o c i a l
choice rule can be trivially implemented. It seems that diminishing the ef-
fect of the agents’ types on their own payog considerably enlarge the set
of rules that can be implemented. We have abstracted thorough the paper
the possible costs the planner may face in choosing one or another contract
structure -the mechanism-, but if they exist, the planner might compare the
implementation gains with the costs associated to each contract. Moreover,
one or another social choice rule or compensation mechanism might be more
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appropriate in digerent contexts: public good provision, production imple-
mentation, etc., but we are always constrained by the menu provided by
Theorem 1.
7 Appendix
Although the dependence of Theorem 1 to the individually decisiveness as-
sumption is clear, we can slightly relax the class of admitted SCCs if we
restrict attention to continuous mechanisms (when both the compensation
functions and the payog functions are continuous when considering the sup
norm). The following result provides the continuous mechanisms version of
Theorem 1., but, before we state it, we need one more deﬁnition and a lemma.
Deﬁnition 4 AS C CKW is called individually quasi-decisive ig ;i 5
N, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, ; > 0, ;k 5 K, <b wi(,k,w3i) 5 Xi such that
k 5 KW(b wi(,k,w3i),w3i) 5 K, k 5 B(k)&<lim<0b wi(,k,w3i). (where
B(k) stands for the open ball with center in k and radius  using the Eu-
clidean metric ).
This property means that everybody can obtain an alternative as close as
desired to any other by reporting an adequate type and is weaker than indi-
vidual decisiveness -every individually decisive SCC is always quasi-decisive,
but the converse is not true-.
Lemma 4 Suppose Xi contains only continuous functions for each i.L e t
{P,q} be a continuous, incentive compatible for i compensation mechanism
implementing the SCC KW, and take two -possibly the same- selections from
KW : g and b g. Then, ;wi,w
0
i 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, ; > 0, <4 > 0 such that
g(wi,w3i) 5 B4(b g(w
0
i,w3i)) , qi(wi,w3i) 5 B(qi(w
0
i,w3i)).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that ;4 > 0, <wi,w
0
i 5 Xi, <w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj, < > 0, such that g(wi,w3i) 5 B4(b g(w
0
i,w3i)) &
qi(wi,w3i) / 5 B(qi(w
0
i,w3i)). Suppose w.l.g. that
qi(wi,w3i)  qi(w
0
i,w3i) > . Then, take type w
0
i, and consider the payogs:
Pi(vi(g(wi,w3i),w
0







by assumption, ;4 > 0, <wi,w
0
i 5 Xi, <w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, such that g(wi,w3i) 5
B4(b g(w
0
i,w3i)), so we can choose wi,w
0
i such that g(wi,w3i) will be as close
to b g(w
0
i,w3i)a sw ew a n t . S i n c eXi includes only continuous functions, we
can make vi(g(wi,w3i),w
0




i)b yc h o o s i n g
wi,w
0
i 5 Xi. But Pi is continuous in both arguments and monotonic so, by
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carefully choosing 4 > 0a n dwi,w
0
i 5 Xi,s i n c eqi(wi,w3i)  qi(w
0













i, <wi 5 Xi, <g(wi,w3i) 5 KW(wi,w3i) ;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, -a
selection from KW-d e ﬁned as:
g(b wi,w3i)=
(





i,w3i) iff b wi = w
0
i
, such that by declaring wi 5 Xi,











i,w3i)), so the mech
anism cannot be incentive compatible for i, a contradiction.
Theorem 2 Suppose that ;i 5 N, Xi is restricted to contain continuous
functions and let KW be an individually quasi-decisive SCC. Then if {P,q}
is an incentive compatible and continuous compensation mechanism that im-
plement KW, then it must be of the form of those in Theorem 1.
Proof. ,) First of all, notice that Lemma 1 applies to every com-





j6=i Xj, such that g(wi,w3i)=g(w
0




Moreover, since KW is individually quasi-decisive, ;i 5 N, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
; > 0, ;k 5 K, <b wi : E++ × K ×
Q
j6=i Xj $$ Xi such that
k 5 KW(b wi(,k,w3i),w3i) 5 K & k 5 B(k). Let us now deﬁne the
following correspondence: b qi : K × X3i $$ E, such that: b qi(k,w3i)=
= qi(lim<0b wi(,k,w3i),w3i)f o r a l l k 5 K, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj.
This mapping is similar to the analogous one used in the proof of Theorem
1.M o r e o v e r ,b qi(k,w3i)a l w a y se x i s ta n di sacontinuous function on K.
Notice that ;k 5 K such that <w
0
i 5 Xi such that k = g(w
0
i,w3i)f o rs o m e
selection g from KW, b qi(k,w3i) is a singleton following the same reasoning in
proving (ii) in Theorem 1 -using Lemma 2 for all i-, and the cases where
;w
0
i 5 Xi,k6= g(w
0
i,w3i), individual quasi-decisiveness assures that the limit
exists. It remains to prove that the function is continuous for every k 5 K, so
we prove the following: ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, ;k 5 K, ;0 > 0, <B(k,0) > 0s u c h
that k 5 BB(k) , b qi(k,w3i) 5 B0(b qi(k,w3i)). By contradiction, suppose that
the converse is true, i.e., <w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <k 5 K, <0 > 0, such that ;B >
0, <k 5 BB(k)&b qi(k,w3i) / 5 B0(b qi(k,w3i)). Then, choose any selection
b q0
i(k,w3i) 5 b qi(k,w3i), ;k 5 K, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj and set any w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj;
Now, take any k 5 K such that <w
0
i 5 Xi such that k = g(w
0
i,w3i)f o rs o m e
selection g from KW. Then, suppose that <k 5 K such that <0 > 0s u c ht h a t
;B > 0, <k(B) 5 BB(k)&b q0
i(k,w3i) / 5 B0(b q0
i(k,w3i)).
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First, since KW is individually quasi-decisive, we know that there exists
some selection g 5 KW such that, for w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,k , k(B) 5 K and ;B > 0,
these two conditions hold:
(i). ;0 > 0, <e wi 5 Xi such that g(e wi,w3i) 5 B0(k).
(ii). ; > 0, <wi 5 Xi such that g(wi,w3i) 5 B(k(B)).
Moreover, by deﬁnition of b wi(,k,w3i), we know that:
e wi 5 B0(lim0<0b wi(0,k,w3i)) and wi 5 B(lim<0b wi(,k(B),w3i)) so it
holds that ;B,,0 > 0, <e wi,wi 5 Xi such that g(e wi,w3i) 5 BB++0(g(wi,w3i)).
Furthermore, by continuity of the bounded compensation functions in
lim<0b wi(,k(B),w3i) and lim0<0b wi(0,k,w3i), it is true that ;b 01,b 02 > 0,
<b B1(b 01),b B2(b 02) > 0, such that
wi 5 Bb B1(b 01)(lim<0b wi(,k(B),w3i)) and w
0
i 5 Bb B2(b 02)(lim0<0b wi(0,k,w3i)),,
, qi(wi,w3i) 5 Bb 01(qi(lim<0b wi(,k(B),w3i),w3i)) and
qi(w
0
i,w3i) 5 Bb 02(qi(lim0<0b wi(0,k,w3i),w3i)). Now, given any B > 0, for
every b 01,b 02 > 0, we can take   b B1(b 01)a n d0  b B2(b 02) and there will exist
e wi,wi 5 Xi with the above properties.
Finally, we can apply Lemma 4 for w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj ,f o rb g = g and
for the above e wi,wi 5 Xi to get: ; > 0, <4 > 0s u c ht h a tg(wi,w3i) 5
B4(b g(w
0
i,w3i)) , qi(wi,w3i) 5 B(qi(w
0
i,w3i)), whenever we choose B,b 01,b 02 >
0 such that, for any given  > 0, 4()  B +  + 0. Then, by (i) and (ii),
it holds: <e wi,wi 5 Xi such that g(wi,w3i) 5 B4(g(e wi,w3i)), so ;,B,b 01,b 02 >
0, <e wi,wi 5 Xi such that:
(1). qi(wi,w3i) 5 B(qi(e wi,w3i)),
(2). qi(wi,w3i) 5 Bb 01(qi(lim<0b wi(,k(B),w3i),w3i)) and
(3). qi(e wi,w3i) 5 Bb 02(qi(lim0<0b wi(0,k,w3i),w3i)).
Now, choose ,b 01,b 02 > 0s u ciently small such that, for example,  +
b 01 + b 02 
0
4
, to observe that (1), (2) and (3) make any 0 > 0 such that
;B > 0, <k(B) 5 BB(k), b q0
i(k,w3i) / 5 B0(b q0
i(k,w3i)) impossible, so we enter
into a contradiction and the function b q0
i(k,w3i) is continuous for all k 5 K.
Now we consider the same kind of composite function of Theorem 1:
b Pi : K ×
Qn
i=1 Xi $ E deﬁned as: ;k 5 K, ;wi 5 Xi, ;w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
b Pi(k,wi,w3i)=Pi(vi(k,wi), b qi(k,w3i)). We know now that, given any w3i 5 Q
j6=i Xj, this function is continuous in the whole K, since Xi are continuous
by assumption and we have already proved that b qi are continuous functions.
Hence suppose, by contradiction, that the theorem is not true: <i 5 N,
<w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj, <wi 5 Xi, <k 5 K such that: b Pi(g(wi,w3i),wi,w3i) <
b Pi(k,wi,w3i) for some selection g from KW-note that in other case, b Pi 5
E2003/12
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W(KW)-, or in other words, the following statements are true:
(i). <b 0 > 0 such that b Pi(k,wi,w3i)  b Pi(g(wi,w3i),wi,w3i)=b 0.
(ii). Since KW is individually quasi-decisive, for k, w3i and any  > 0, there
exist a selection fromb wi such that <k 5 K such that k 5 KW(b wi(,k,w3i),w3i) 5
K & k 5 B(k).
(iii). Since given wi and w3i, b Pi is continuous in K, in particular for
k it is true that: ;0 > 0, <B(k,0) > 0 3 k5 BB(k) , Pi(k,wi,w3i) 5
B0(Pi(k,wi,w3i)).
First, using (iii), for k 5 K, for b 0 > 0, <B(k,b 0) > 0 3 e k 5 BB(k,b 0)(k)
-by (b)- , b Pi(e k,wi,w3i) 5 Bb 0(b Pi(k,wi,w3i)). Now, let us set  = B(k,b 0); by
(ii), for this  there will exist e wi 3 e k 5 KW(e wi(B(k,b 0),k,w3i),w3i) 5 K &
e k 5 BB(k,b 0)(k). Finally, this last expression can be written as: for k 5 K and
given wi and w3i, <e wi(B(k,b 0),k,w3i), <e k 5 KW(e wi,w3i) 5 K s.t. ¯ ¯ ¯b Pi(k,wi,w3i))  b Pi(e k,wi,w3i)
¯ ¯ ¯ < b 0 and b Pi(k,wi,w3i))b Pi(g(wi,w3i),wi,w3i)=
b 0 by deﬁnition, so it has to be that for k 5 K, wi 5 Xi and w3i 5
Q
j6=i Xj,
<e wi(B(k,b 0),k,w3i), <e k 5 KW(e wi,w3i) 5 K such that there exists the fol-
lowing selection from KW :
e g(w)=
½ e ki f f (wi,w3i)=( e wi,w3i)
g(wi,w3i) otherwise
such that
b Pi(e g(e wi,w3i),wi,w3i) > b Pi(e g(wi,w3i),wi,w3i), which is the same that
Pi(vi(e g(e wi,w3i),wi),q i(e wi,wi)) >P i(vi(e g(wi,w3i),wi),q i(wi,w3i))
so the compensation mechanism fails to be incentive compatible for some i:
a contradiction.
+)T h es u ciency part of the proof is exactly the same that the one in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 shows that our main result is robust even if we enlarge the
set of admissible social rules to individually quasi-decisive SCCs. The price
to pay is assuming the continuity of the compensation mechanisms, a prop-
erty that does not seem to be extremely restrictive when working with our
complex set of feasible alternatives. Nevertheless, we can say nothing about
the set of discontinuous mechanisms implementing individually quasi-decisive
SCCs.
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